Following the Manila campaign, the regiment reorganized and re- equipped in Manila and, on 7 April 1945 received orders to move to Naguilian to join in the attack on Baguio, the Philippine summer capital and one of the remaining Japanese strong points on Luzon. The Regimental Command Post opened at the base camp at Naguilian Air Strip on 9 April 1945. On 13 April, the 3rd Battalion passed through elements of the 129th Infantry near Monglo Hill, on Highway 9 leading to Baguio.
For the next eighteen days, the regiment fought a bitterly contested battle against an extremely stubborn Japanese force. The mountainous character of the terrain was such that the advance was road- bound and offered the Japanese superior positions from which to fight a costly delaying action. From caves in the hills, both on and overlooking the main supply road, the enemy was in position to cause heavy casualties. At the same time they remained safe from all but direct hits from the air or from artillery.
Once again it was necessary to engage in furious close- in battles to drive the enemy from their strong points. On 13 April 1945, the Third Battalion, advancing along Highway 9 from Monglo Hill toward Baguio, employed medium tanks against enemy positions in caves along the road, and reached the west slope of Hairpin Hill after an advance of 1500 yards against moderate resistance. Mines, encountered along the road during the day’s advance, were removed by the Engineers. On the following day, Companies I and K attained the high ground at Hairpin Hill where they established defensive positions for the night. During the hours of darkness, several enemy attempts at infiltration were repulsed, with severe losses to the Japanese attackers. Continuing the drive, Companies I and K drove across the high ground and secured Hairpin Hill overlooking the main supply road.
Since the rough and mountainous terrain confined the action to the road, the plan of attack was necessarily limited to a column of battalions. On 15 April, the 1st Battalion passed through the 3rd and continued to push along the road, wiping out scattered resistance.
As the inexorable advance of the Regiment continued, the enemy withdrew, abandoning large amounts of ammunition and supplies along the road. No large scale enemy defensive positions were encountered until our forces reached the bridge over the Irisan River. Here reconnaissance patrols located what appeared to be a strong defensive line with particularly strong defenses on both sides of the Irisan River Bridge.
On 17 April, the 2nd Battalion passed through the 1st, with G Company leading the attack. By 1035, leading elements of G Company had reached the last turn in the road, 400 yards from the Irisan River bridge. Two medium tanks were supporting the advance. The highway bridge over the river had been blown by the enemy, and the only crossing over the river was by means of a hastily- constructed bypass. As the leading elements prepared to round the corner to assault the bridge, two enemy tanks, one light and one medium, raced around this last corner without warning. On the back of each tank was a platform carrying six enemy riflemen, firing at any target which presented itself. The speed of the enemy attack was so great that the leading enemy tank was abreast of our advance tank before our fire could be brought to bear on it. This tank had mines lashed to it, indicating the intention of its occupants to destroy it and any vehicle with which the tank might come in contact. Pointblank fire from our second tank literally blew the enemy’s tank apart, leaving only the treads on the road. The light tank was also destroyed by our tank fire. During this ‘‘ mechanized banzai attack, ’’ enemy fire caused moderate casualties.
The regimental commander, Colonel White, who was accompanying the leading elements in the assault upon this key defensive position, was seriously wounded in the thigh. The reason White was so far forward was that the Division Commanding General had radioed him asking what the hell was taking his regiment so long to get to Baguio. White had then phoned the head battalion which contacted the lead company which sent a message to the point platoon, and the answer to the general’s query came back in one word ‘‘ Japs. ’’
At this slow rate, it would take us another two days to reach Baguio, and the pressure was on from MacArthur’s command to finish the mission fast.
So Colonel White walked over to my dugout at regimental headquarters and said, ‘‘ Stan, come on, we’re going to drive up and see what’s keeping our men pinned down so long. ’’
We hopped in a jeep and he drove. He was angry because he suspected that the troops were dogging it. As we drove along the road, we noted the men lolling about; the column had stopped, no firing was heard, and everyone seemed satisfied that they could read some letters, finger their K rations, and catch up on some sleep, fueling the Colonel’s ire. A few minutes later when we reached the lead company, his fury had reddened his face to the color of his hair. Spotting the company commander, he hopped out of the jeep, with me about ten steps behind. ‘‘ What the hell are you loafers doing . . . let’s get moving . . . even if you have a kick a few butts to do it. ’’ The captain, who had been through a number of campaigns in the jungle where ten yards advance was a victory, shrugged his shoulders and began to walk slowly, very slowly, toward the lead platoon which had huddled on this side of the sharp turn, unwilling to creep and crawl around the bend because they had the intuition that mortal danger would be creeping along toward them. Furious, White dashed up to the three riflemen at the point, the little GI’s who were supported by thousands of infantry, artillery, airplanes, tanks, quartermaster, ordnance, ships, factories, trucks all behind them and all pushing them inexorably into the muzzle blast of a Japanese machine gun. This was as far as the United States of America extended in this war, and this was where the heroes were, and from here the dead and wounded men would be carried back to aid stations, hospitals, or cemeteries. White ran up to the trio and said, ‘‘ Get your asses going around that turn. ’’
‘‘ Colonel, sir, there are Japs around that turn. We’re waiting for some flame throwers before making the turn. ’’ ‘‘ Horseshit, ’’ said White, ‘‘ there’s not a Jap for a mile, ’’ and like all good leaders should, he started round the bend by himself, with the company commander a few steps behind and with me an even more discreet ten feet back.
The moment he made the turn he was confronted by the two ‘‘ banzai’’ Japanese tanks with turret guns blazing, and men shooting rifles in our direction. White was hit in the upper thigh by a blast, knocked off the side of the road, landing about ten yards below in a small grassy expanse only a few feet wide. The Captain had his head blown off. I dropped my carbine and instinctively jumped down off the road toward what could have been a 2 mile drop. But, fortunately, I landed on this same God- given expanse which had saved first White and now me from a death leap. White was in semi- shock and his thigh was gushing blood. I was in complete shock and only came out of it when he groaned ‘‘ Tourniquet. ’’ Miraculously, and I do not use that word lightly, along with us was the Regimental Catholic Chaplain, Elmer Heindl, one of the most saintly men I have ever met. While I lay there paralyzed with fear and ignorance, he proceeded to bind up the colonel’s leg, probably saving his life.
The firing above us was furious and screaming and groans mixed in with the tank and rifle fire. After what seemed like an hour, but actually was only five minutes, the firing put- putted to a stop, the moans rose in volume, and the thank- God voices of American GI’s were heard ‘‘ He’s dead’’ . . . ‘‘ Finish this one off. ’’ ‘‘ Get the litter bearers. ’’ ‘‘ Put some grenades in the tanks. ’’ ‘‘ Where’s the Colonel? ’’ To the latter question I gasped, ‘‘ We’re all down here’’, and within a few minutes the infantry heroes and medics had put White on a stretcher (for one embarrassing moment I almost lay down in it myself), and then they hand- pulled me up in time for me to witness the colonel being placed on a jeep ambulance, to note the carnage, the dead and dying Japs and Americans, the smoking tanks. We could now proceed to the next bend and maybe some more of the same.
I walked over to Colonel White who, though still in shock, and in pain, could whisper, ‘‘ I guess I was wrong . . . there were a few lousy Japs. ’’ Then he passed out . . . came to again as the jeep was slowly winding down the road . . . and he waved wanly at me and mouthed what I have since learned is the West Pointer’s ‘‘ goodbye’’: ‘‘ It was good soldiering with you. ’’ I didn’t return the compliment. I was able to see him again in a Manila hospital two weeks later where he refused to let the doctors amputate his leg. We were next together a year later, after the War, in Washington, with his wife and two children, where he had been discharged from the service, limping badly but standing with military bearing. He had joined our intelligence service which later became the CIA; he was much later named its Executive Director.
Let’s return to the attack on Baguio: During the remainder of the day, the 2nd Battalion pushed forward against heavy resistance from the ridge on the east bank of the Irisan River. Strong Japanese positions on the high ground east of the river made further advances impossible. On the following day, the 3rd Battalion launched an attack, crossed the river and secured the high ground south of Highway 9, east of the river. From this position, they could bring fire to bear upon the hill mass from which the enemy were holding up the advance of the 2nd Battalion.
Two days of mopping up and of short advances followed, with the 1st Battalion preparing to pass through the 2nd in the assault upon the hill overlooking the Irisan River bridge. With the 2nd Battalion covering, the 1st Battalion launched its attack upon the strongly- defended key hill south of the Irisan River, on the left of the highway. After a strong attack, Companies A and C reached the top of the hill and secured the position. During the day and night following, four separate enemy counterattacks were repulsed and the enemy driven off. In one attempted counterattack against Company A’s positions, approximately 50 Japanese were observed moving toward the point occupied by the Company Command Post. Only ten men from Company Headquarters were present, and a quick call for reinforcements brought two squads of the First Platoon to assist in repelling the attack.
Even though outnumbered, the two squads and company headquarters personnel placed themselves at the crest of the hill, and awaited the company’s approach. As the Japanese came within 30 yards of their position, the small force of Americans jumped to their feet and rushed down the slope. Firing as they ran forward, they killed many of the enemy. As the grenade- throwing Americans came within range for close- in fighting, the Japanese, stunned by the ferocity of the attack, broke and ran. Continuing to fire, the Americans drove the enemy completely off the hill, and later counted 35 dead Japanese on the slope of the hill. In C Company’s area during the same period, three separate enemy counterattacks were repulsed with only minor casualties to our forces.
In four days of the fiercest type of fighting, against a stubborn and well- emplaced enemy, the main Japanese defense line west of Baguio was broken, and the attack was tremendously accelerated. During the four days fighting around Irisan, 430 enemy were killed with only moderate losses to ourselves and thousands of rounds of enemy artillery and mortar ammunition were captured. In addition, three .15 centimeter guns, two .75 millimeter guns and numerous machine guns, rifles and other equipment were taken. In spite of a determined enemy and almost perpendicular hills and rainy weather, the regiment had broken the back of the enemy defenses and insured the success of the drive on Baguio.
On 21 April, the 148th Infantry left the road and moved almost due east toward the Trinidad Rice Bowl, to cut the Japanese escape route from the Baguio area. Rapid progress against isolated resistance enabled the regiment to reach the hills west of the Bowl, where patrol action and minor engagements continued until 29 April. Then, in the final action to cut off the Japanese retreat from Baguio north through Trinidad, the regiment crossed the Bowl and secured the hill mass north of Trinidad. Using medium tanks, M- 7 self- propelled howitzers, M- 8’s and M- 12’s, artillery and mortar fire against stiff resistance, our forces secured the hill mass overlooking the Japanese route of withdrawal to the north. On 1 May 1945, the 129th Infantry relieved the 148th Infantry in that sector.
In this abbreviated campaign, the 148th Infantry killed 1121 enemy and captured a sizable quantity of enemy arms and material. Among the enemy ordnance captured were one .77 millimeter gun, six .75 millimeter guns, six .81 millimeter mortars, 17 .50 millimeter mortars, three .15 centimeter guns, one 47 millimeter gun, five .37 millimeter guns, 15 heavy machine guns, 7 light machine guns, and two 20 millimeter antiaircraft guns. In addition, hundreds of cases of ammunition, dynamite, food and miscellaneous supplies were taken as the regiment drove the Japanese from their prepared positions along the road to Baguio.
Considering the character of the terrain and the subsequent advantage accruing to the defender, the casualty figures for the Regiment of five officers and 67 enlisted men killed in action and 14 officers and 245 enlisted men wounded in action, were considered ‘‘ moderate, ’’ unless you knew the 81 dead . . . or were family.